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Turkey has unilaterally decided to harmonize its tariffication  structure with that of the European
Union.  For the country's authorities, this move to a Customs Union is only meant to be the first step
toward fuller integration with Europe.  There are signs, however, that political opposition to the
government's pro competitive stance may be strong enough to bloc any further rapprochement with
Europe.  We suggest, using an applied intertemporal GE analysis, that to be welfare  improving, the
trade reform would have to be pursued further and nontariff barriers on European trade removed.
Failure to do so could be more detrimental to domestic welfare than no reform at all.
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641.  Introduction
Turkey  (TR)  has long  held  aspirations  of becoming  a full member  of the  former
European  Economic  Community  (EEC),  now  the  European  Union  (EU).1  Despite  the
rejection  of its official  re-application  for full membership  in  April  1987,  TR  pursued
unilaterally  its trade liberalization  efforts vis  ta  vis the EEC by  substantially  reducing its
sectoral  tariffs  on its  European  imports.  In March  1995,  TR  decided  to harmonize  its
tariffication structure  with that of the EU in a "Customs Union"  (CU)  which has been put
into effect in January,  1996.
For the Turkish authorities today,  this move to a CU is only meant to be the first step
toward  the  country's  integration  in  the European  Union.  The  next phase  will  require
complying  with the European  Single Market rules, i.e., full integration  of the commodity
markets. 2  As  one  expects,  such  a pro  competitive  policy  does  not generate  unanimous
support in the country.  Lobby groups are actively working to mobilize various elements of
opposition to bring the pro competitive  effort to a stop.  The outcome  of this political game is
of course hard to predict, but it seems unlikely that the opposition parties  will manage  to
force  a complete policy reversal in the immediate future.  Hence,  a likely compromise could
be as follows: the  CU is history in the making and therefore  a fact, but achievement  of the
second phase of the trade reform program has to be postponed if not altogether dropped from
the agenda.
It is our objective in this paper to shed some light on the desirability,  for TR, of such a
status quo.  For this purpose, we use  an applied intertemporal  GE model of foreign  trade
which  recognizes  increasing  returns  to  scale  production  technologies  in  many  sectors;
existence  of firm  level product differentiation;  and oligopolistic  market  structures.  Our
findings suggest strong  negative  welfare effects from the  CU with Europe,  because  of the
initially heavily distorted  nature of the Turkish economy.  In contrast, the  second phase of
the trade reform is projected to yield substantial gains for the domestic economy, though the
1  Turkey's  first official  application  to join  the EEC  was made  as early  as  1959.  This led to  the  1963
Ankara Agreement and the  1970 Added Protocol,  which provided a specific blueprint of adjustment
toward harmonization  of the Turkish economy with its European counterparts.  The relations suffered a
stalemate between  1980 and 1986, as a result of the military coup of September, 1980.
2  Ultimately, monetary  and labor market integration will have to be achieved if TR is to become a full
member  of the EU.  Whether  this  third phase can be achieved in a reasonably near future is highly
doubtful  for both economical and political reasons.  We  therefore  disregard this as a realistic current
policy option.  65cumulative gains remain quite modest.  Our conclusion is therefore  clear:  from the point of
view of TR, simple harmonization  of the tariff system -the  CU-can only be regarded  as
an interim  phase  which  has to  be  complemented  with  further steps  toward  full  market
integration  with the  EU.  A  political  compromise  that  would  result in  a  CU  status quo
appears to be the worst possible option with likely negative  welfare consequences  for the
country.
It is worth highlighting that,  in contrast  to most (if not to  all)  previous  applied GE
modeling efforts of the Turkish economy,  we do not restrict our analysis to the measure of
static  reallocation  effects.  Our framework  is intertemporal:  we  are  able  to  apprehend
transitional  dynamic  consequences  of the policy  options,  and their growth  effects.3  To
emphasize the importance of these effects, we provide a comparison between the predictions
of the  intertemporal  model,  and  those generated  from  its  static equivalent.4  The  results
suggest that failure  to take  dynamic effects into account may lead to  questionable  policy
conclusions.5
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In section 2, we present the main features of the
GE model, introduce the welfare measure and discuss our numerical treatment of dynamics.
The  policy  scenarios  are  presented  in  section 3  together  with  a  discussion  of the  main
mechanisms  at work based on partial equilibrium  arguments.  In section 4, we discuss the
policy results, and we conclude in section 5. A formal presentation  of the model is given in
Appendix A.  Some  aspects  of  the  calibration  and  of  the  computational  strategy  are
discussed  in Appendix B.6
3  Previous  applied GE analyses  of the Turkish economy  include:  Dervis  et al. (1982),  Lewis and Urata
(1983), Grais et al. (1984), Celasun  (1986), Yeldan (1989)  and Harrison et al. (1993).
4  By  static equivalent  we mean  the original framework  adequately  restricted  for  the capital  stock  and
foreign debt to remain constant.
5  It also has to be noted that the Turkish official Input/Output  (I/O) and labor market statistics suffer from
considerable  biases which  distort policy  conclusions.  Mercenier  and  Yeldan  (1996)  highlight, for
instance,  that the officially  published I/O data consistently  report implausibly high  capital  to labor
ratios in value added, with capital shares approaching  to 90 percent in most sectors.  The authors show
that those biases  are large enough to affect basic policy recommendations.  In a recent effort to correct
these biases,  Kose  and  Yeldan  (1996)  provide  new  estimates  of factor  shares  compiled  from  the
Household Labor Survey Statistics  and from the Manufacturing  Industry Surveys,  which appear to be
more reliable (though the  share of capital in value added remains puzzlingly high in some sectors).  We
use this data base in the current analysis.
6  The data base has been documented else where: see Mercenier (1995a) and Mercenier and Yeldan (1996).
662.  The  Model
2.1  Overview
Turkey  (TR)  is part of a world economy  consisting of itself and  six other regions:
Great Britain (GB), the  Federal Republic of Germany (D), France  (F), Italy (1), the  rest of
the EU, and the rest of the world (ROW).  Each country has  nine sectors of production, of
which  four  are  perfectly  competitive. 7  In  these  sectors,  countries  are  linked  by  an
Armington system  so that commodities  are differentiated  in demand by their geographical
origin.  The other five industries are modeled as noncompetitive.8 In the latter sectors, firms
are assumed to be symmetric  within national boundaries.  They operate with fixed primary
factor costs and therefore  face  increasing  returns  to scale  in production.  They  have  no
monopsony power on any market for inputs, either primary or intermediate.  Each individual
oligopolist produces a different good.  Industry structure  is assumed fixed in the short run;
oligopolistic firms may then experience non zero profits.  In the long run, however, entry
and  exit of competitors  in  a Chamberlinian  fashion  ensure  that  these rents  vanish.  The
competitive  game  between  oligopolistic  firms  is  assumed  to  be  Cournot-Nash.  The
instantaneous GE concept adopted is a compromise in terms of informational requirements
between the primitive conjectural Coumot-Nash-Walras  equilibrium of Negishi (1961)  and
the objective Cournot-Nash-Walras equilibrium  introduced by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972).9
In all sectors, competitive and noncompetitive,  a detailed country- and sector-specific  system
of price-responsive  intermediate  demands  is specified  that recognizes  differences  among
products from individual oligopolistic suppliers  t la Ethier (1982).
Final demand decisions are made in each country by a single representative  household
that is competitive, infinitely lived, and utility-maximizing.  The domestic household  owns all
the country's primary factors,  namely, labor and physical capital, which it rents to domestic
firms only, at the same competitive  price regardless of the sector.  In the short run, however,
7  The four perfectly competitive sectors are agriculture and primary products; food, beverage, and tobacco;
other  manufacturing  industries  (textile,  wood,  paper,  metallurgy  and  minerals);  and  transport  and
services.
The  noncompetitive  industries  are  pharmaceutical  products;  chemistry  other  than  pharmaceutical
products; motor vehicles; office  machinery; and other machinery and transport materials.
9  Noncompetitive  firms are endowed  with full knowledge  of the preferences  and technologies  of their
clients,  and  they  make  use  of this knowledge  when  maximizing  profits.  In  their maximization,
however, they neglect the feedback effect of their decisions on their profits via income  (the Ford  effect,
see Gabszewicz and Vial, 1972) and via input-output multipliers (the Nikaido effect, see Nikaido, 1975).
67total returns to capital may differ across  industries: oligopolistic  profits may add to capital
rental earnings  because of unexpected shocks.  We abstract from leisure/labor decisions  and
population  growth  so  that  the  variables  under household  control  are  consumption  and
investment. In making  optimal decisions  subject to their intertemporal  budget constraints,
households  can  borrow  or lend  on international  markets.  All final  demands recognize
differences among products from individual oligopolistic firms a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
The only explicit role of the government is to raise tariffs, the proceeds of which are
rebated to domestic  consumers lump-sum.
National markets  are assumed to be segmented in the initial equilibrium:  because  of
various  forms  of nontariff  barriers  (NTBs)-such  as  norms,  government  procurement
policies,  security  regulations-that  prevent  consumers  from  cross-border  arbitraging,
noncompetitive firms behave as price-discriminating  oligopolists.
2.2  The  Welfare  Measure
Central to our analysis is the measure  of welfare  gains, which we now make precise.
Let C(t) be the reference  stream of consumption and  C(t) be the corresponding time profile
computed after implementation  at t=O of a once  and for all previously  unexpected  trade
policy change.  The  welfare  gain is determined  from  the  following  utility indifference
condition:
e-p  C(t) (1  +)  dt  =  e-Pt  C(t) - dt ,
that is, the welfare gain resulting from the policy change is equivalent from the perspective of
the representative  Turkish household to increasing  the  reference consumption  profile by 4
percent.  The measure 0 accounts for both transitional  and long-term effects  of the policy on
the household's well-being, putting relatively low weight on the latter because of discounting
at rate p.  It is sometimes  useful to  restrict the welfare  analysis to steady-state  effects,  in
particular when making comparisons with predictions from  static  models.  To do this, we
define limt-..C(t) = Css,  limt -.C(t)  = Css,  and we plug these constant values into the utility
indifference condition.  Rearranging,  we get
Css (1+4ss)  = Css,
where  #ss  is the (equivalent variation) welfare measure most frequently used in static applied
GE analysis.
682.3  The  Numerical  Treatment  of  Dynamics
The  model is  calibrated  on base  year data assuming  the  world economy  in steady
state.10  For the computation  of the transitional dynamics,  we make use of recent results by
Mercenier and Michel (1994)  on temporal aggregation.  We briefly sketch how the  "curse of
dimensionality"  can be overturned using these results.
We  write  each  representative  household's  intertemporal  decision  problem  in  the
following abstract and compact form:
(3)  Max  e-P t  g(x(t),u(t)) dt  s.t.  x(t)  = f(x(t),u(t))  ,  x(O) =  xo  given,
where  x(t), u(t) are respectively  state  and decision  vectors,  and standard  assumptions  are
made  on the functions g(.) and f(.)  for a  stationary  solution  (,$)  to exist.  Consider  the
following finite horizon discrete-time  approximate  to problem  (3):
N-I
Max  ancA  g(x(tn),u(tn))  +  f3N- g(x,u(x)))
(4)  n  =O
s.t.  x(tn+i) - x(tn)  =  Anf(x(tn),u(tn)),  0 <  n <  N-l,  x(to) = xo given,
where  tn (n=0,...,N) are  dates (possibly unequally spaced), An  =  tn+l - tn,  an and  N  are
(unknown)  discount  factors,  and  u(x)  is  such  that f(x,u(x))  = 0.  Proposition  2 of
Mercenier and Michel (1994) ensures that (3) and (4) have the same stationary equilibrium, if
and only if the discount factors  an and fiN  satisfy:
an+1  =  o  <  n  N-2
(1  +  p An+ 1 )
ION  =  aN-1.
We solve the model on a horizon of 35 years using five unequally  distant grid dates: to= 1,
t1=5,  t2=10,  t3=20,  and  tN=t4=35 . Though  the  time-aggregation  bias  is  obviously
unknown-to  evaluate this would require solving the system on a dense time grid, which is
10  Though  questionable  for most LDCs, the steady state assumption is systematically adopted in  applied
GE models because it is extremely convenient for calibration.  Mercenier and Sampai'o de Souza (1994)
and Stockey (1995)  are rare exceptions.  Whether the additional complication  is useful is still an open
question.  69not possible  given the size of the model-results  reported in Mercenier and Michel (1994)
suggest that such approximations  are quite accurate.
In  the  time-aggregated  framework,  the  welfare  criterion  becomes  the  following:
determine 0 such that
N-  N-1
an  An [(t)(1+)]-+  fiN i[C(t)(1+  =  Ac+a  C(t)  + fN  C(tN)
n=O  n=0
3.  Description  of  the  Experiments
3.1  The  Benchmark
Nominally at least, the European  Single Market  has been  completed  since January
1993.  In practice, of course, the program will take some time to become  fully implemented
and indeed longer still before its effects can  be observed in the data.  We therefore generate
as an initial simulation the  new international  environment in which Turkey has to make its
future policy decisions, i.e., we compute the post-Europe  '92 equilibrium.  This equilibrium
serves as the benchmark for our following policy simulations.
3.2  The  Trade Policy  Experiments
In our first experiment,  we  implement the Turkish  commitment  to enter a customs
union with the EU.  Technically, this consists to set most tariffs on European imports to zero
and  to harmonize the rates on imports from  the ROW with the existing European  rates.11
Formally, for most sectors,
"EU,TR = 0,  ZROW,TR  =  TROW,EU,
where 'ij  is the tariff rate on flows from/to country ilj.
11  Under the current policy setting, existing EU tariffication system on ROW imports are based on varying
rates, with continuous  adjustments.  At the time of writing, we adopted the then  existing (May,  1996)
sectoral averages as our prevailing EU rates.  These range from 0 percent (in pharmacy) to  10 percent (in
other manufacturing).  Furthermore,  the current system leaves primary agriculture and processed food
products outside the scope of the CU.
70In the second experiment,  TR is assumed to join the European Single Market. 12  This
implies that, in addition to tariff harmonization,  both the Turkish  and the European  firms
switch from their initial price-discriminating  strategy to a single-pricing  behavior within the
Extended EU (henceforth:  EEU=EU+TR).  Formally, let vi,s be the marginal production cost
of a firm operating in sector s of country i; zi,SJ andpi,sj respectively  the amount sold and
the price charged  by the same firm on market j.  The optimal  pricing strategy of the firm is
determined  from
Pi,s,TR - Vi,s  log Pi,s,TR  alog Pi,s,EEU
(5)  = A  +  (1-  A)
Pi,s,TR  0log  Zi,s,TR  alog  Zi,s,EEU
with A= 1  in the calibration.  The  experiment consists to set A=O with the elasticity on the
right is evaluated using the EEU-aggregated demand.
The rationale behind this experiment is as follows:  various forms of nontariff barriers
(NTBs) exist, which confer to firms (domestic  and foreign) the power to price discriminate
between TR and other markets.  Full integration of TR in the EU involves suppressing  all
forms of NTBs.  This should restore  cross-border  arbitraging  and force  firms to charge a
unique price within the EEU.  Because NTBs are essentially unobservable,  we treat them as
latent variables, and generate the effects of their elimination by forcing the individual firms to
adopt single pricing within the (now extended)  European market on the basis of their average
EEU-wide monopoly power.  The  interpretation is that this behavioral change is the firm's
optimal strategic reaction to the disappearance  of the NTBs.
What can TR expect from  such a  trade integration  experiment in terms  of welfare?
Turkish firms  are  thought, initially,  to  charge higher prices  in their domestic  market,  in
which they usually hold the largest share (see Table  1.1).  A move to a single-price  strategy
within the EEU would, therefore, induce a reduction of prices charged by those firms on the
home market (together with increases in export prices; see Table  1.2 for the initial ratio of
domestic price to average  export prices to EU).  The conjecture  is that consumer prices will
decline relative to factor prices and that Turkish households will be better off.  In addition, in
the  long run,  a rationalization effect  a la  Harris  (1984)  could result from adjustments  in
industry structure.  Indeed, the new pricing  rule could reduce industry profits,13 induce exit
12  See, among others, Smith and Venables (1988)  and Mercenier (1995a).
13  Although from an individual  firm's point of view, the switch to single pricing should reduce its profits
if everything  else is held  fixed, it is  far from obvious that this  will be the case when  all firms  in the





:  0  -0o0  0"oetN






0%  ClNO  *  0  v
M  M  W)  '  In ry  n






00  C  0  0  0-+  v  O0 s00ON  00  000
'.0  N  e  M  M  M  00















O  -r  000e
0  O  000  eO
'  O  O  C~
0  0 0
i.
VcC  cU00
v 00LE0)  G  ..


























































o  n  N00N-NNd'
e  et  v't  N  4  n  D  M
N  M  O  N  00  %0  'C  %0  %IO  'O'so that a smaller number  of surviving  firms  would operate  on  a  larger scale  with  lower
average costs. 14  The positive outcome for the consumer of this structural  adjustment could,
however,  be offset by two companion effects.  Exit of firms from an industry means reduced
product diversity.  This has  a direct welfare cost, since consumers  are endowed with love-
of-variety  type  of preferences  (see  Dixit and Stiglitz,  1977).  Furthermore,  diversity  in
available  intermediate  goods  affects production efficiency  in all  sectors:  everything  else
equal,  exit  of firms  in  an  industry  increases  variable  unit  costs  in  all  other  sectors,
competitive and noncompetitive  (see Ethier, 1982).  Our aim here is to measure these effects
and  analyze  how  they  combine  to  affect  the  level  and  pattern-intertemporal  and
intersectoral--of welfare, production, and employment.
3.3  Highlight  of  the  Basic  Mechanisms  at  Work
Systematic sectoral patterns are,  of course, not to be expected because of GE effects.
One may nevertheless  trace the type of adjustments that take place using selected  sectoral
variables  and partial equilibrium  arguments.  For this purpose,  we give  in  Table 2  some
results for TR's chemical industry.  The first part of the table  illustrates the importance  of
market segmentation in the calibrated equilibrium and the effect this segmentation has on the
firm's  initial pricing  behavior.  Turkish firms  in this industry  clearly  price-discriminate
between the domestic and foreign customers.  They charge the highest price on the domestic
market in which they enjoy a strong monopoly advantage due to their large market share.
The second part of the table reports on the effects  of TR's forming  a customs  union
with the EU.  Numbers are percentage  deviations from the benchmark.  For clarity, we only
report results for the first year following the policy implementation and for the steady state.
As  Turkish  customers  substitute  in favor  of foreign goods,  domestic  prices  are  forced
downward  in all sectors, and lead to a fall in factor prices (w and r).  Variable unit costs v
therefore unambiguously fall in all sectors, as well as total fixed costs in those industries  that
are noncompetitive.  In the domestic market, foreign penetration erodes the monopoly power
previously  enjoyed by local producers  in the chemical  industry:  the firm's average selling
price p falls  by  12.7  percent.  Note that in  this industry,  the  drop  in p unambiguously
exceeds  the cost saving effect of the trade liberalization  (average  costs V  decline  by  8.1
percent)  so that, even if the production  scale  were  to remain  unchanged,  the firm would
experience  negative  profits.  The  situation is actually  worse:  because of a combination of
14  Obviously, if only because of substitution effects, new firms could simultaneously enter the industry in
some other countries.
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9-4substitution and income effects, the firm is forced up along its average  cost curve since the
volume of its sales Q declines  by 4.6 percent.  The  average scale  in the Turkish chemical
industry is unambiguously too small for all existing firms to survive.  More than a quarter of
the firms  will be  forced  out of the market (28.7  percent),  hence making  it  possible  for
survivors to operate more efficiently,  i.e., on a larger scale (1.8  percent) with lower total unit
costs  (11.1  percent).  The  long term  efficiency  gains (i.e.,  the  real  cost  savings  due  to
increased  scale  on  initial  output)  achieved  in  the  sector  because  of  this  industry-
rationalization mechanism  (Harris,  1984) amounts to approximately 2.0 percent.  Figure  la
schematizes  this basic mechanism.15
In the  third part of Table  2,  we  report on  the effects  of TR's joining the  European
Single  Market.  All numbers  are percentage  deviations  from  the post-CU equilibrium. 16
This is highlighted  in Figure lb by the fact that at the initial first year production  scale Qo,
total unit costs Vo exceed  the average selling price po and profits  are negative. 17  Turkish
oligopolists initially charge the highest price on their home market, whichever the industry.
The adoption of a single pricing rule within the EEU integrated market therefore results in
lower prices for domestic consumers  and lower average selling prices for local producers of
chemical products in the short run (-4.8%).  This reduction in the price-cost margins boosts
demand up by 17.4 percent.  At the aggregate level, the same mechanism operates resulting
in increased  competition  for resources  (short term  wages and  capital  rentals increase  by
approximately 2%) but generally  with lower prices in noncompetitive  industries.  As a result,
the variable  unit costs in Turkish chemicals are essentially unchanged  (+0.1%).  Though
total fixed costs have also increased, unit production costs have been reduced by 3.8 percent
since the firms now operate  at larger scale.  The achieved gains in efficiency  (14.7%)  are,
however, not large enough to prevent existing firms from experiencing negative profits  (the
thicker  shaded  rectangle  in Figure  lb)  and  some  producers  will  be  forced  out  of that
industry.  The necessary  long term change in industry concentration  turns out to be  quite
modest (-0.9%) thanks to growth effects which will be documented  in the next section.
15  For graphical convenience,  we make the simplifying assumption that both average  and marginal  cost
curves are unaffected by the trade experiments.
16  To get the cumulative  deviation effect of the  two policies  w.r. to the  benchmark  therefore  requires
summing the reported results of the two simulations.
17  The thinner shaded  rectangle in Figure lb is accordingly the  same as  in Figure la.  As was also  the
case  in the previous  one, for graphical convenience  we  assume in  the figure  that both  average and
marginal cost curves are fixed.
754.  Is  a Customs  Union  With Europe  Enough?
The first policy we evaluate is the CU currently under implementation.  The first part of
Table 3 reports the solution time profile  of major aggregate  variables.  The tariff reform
induces a strong deterioration  of the terms of trade.  The wealth contraction  shifts the time
profile  of consumption  downward.  Investment increases  over the  whole  time horizon,
however, despite the negative wealth shock.  This is because the new time structure of prices
make  it optimal  for  consumers  to  substitute  future  for  current  consumption.  Hence,
production capacities increase though not monotonously:  the capital stock overshoots its new
steady-state  level during the transition.  As a result, the long-term  supply of capital services
only mildly increases, by less than one percent.  Important  intersectoral adjustments  take
place simultaneously.  In particular,  rationalization  of imperfectly  competitive  industries
improve  the  competitiveness  of the  country's  industrial  sector,  generating  long-term
aggregate efficiency gains (i.e., real cost savings due to increased  scale on initial output) of
almost three percent.  However,  the policy's overall positive impact on steady-state  factor
supply and efficiency  is too modest to compensate  for the terms of trade  loss: the  welfare
cost amounts to a sacrifice  of real consumption  on the whole  time horizon of almost  one
percent (0=-0.832 %).18  The results clearly suggest that a partial trade liberalization policy,
limited to the tariff harmonization reform as currently under implementation, is undesirable.
If Turkey were to join the European Single Market, it would have to get rid not only of
tariffs but also of all forms of nontariff barriers.  Observe from Figure 2 how the elimination
of NTBs shifts up the time path of consumption, but only mildly affects  the time profile of
aggregate  variables.  The  second part  of Table 3 confirms that the overall impact on  the
economy  is quite  substantial. 19  The reason is  to be  found in sectors  of activity initially
dominated  by  inefficient  local  oligopolists.  The  opening  up  of  domestic  markets  to
international competition forces  Turkish producers to cut prices in the domestic  market-
where  they  have  large  shares  and,  hence,  strong  monopoly  power-and  to  move  down
along their average  cost curve  to face  the  induced expansion  of demand.  The efficiency
gains  hence  achieved  by  the  second-phase  reform  vary  between  12  and  19  percent
(depending on the position on the time axis).  The cost-saving shock has a positive wealth
effect which is responsible for the upward shift of the consumption profile.  It also boosts up
capital  accumulation  with  an  expansion  of steady-state  capacities  close  to  2  percent.
18  In all calculations, we use a discount rate of 7%.
19  Note that the table reports the marginal impact of each policy experiment, whereas  cumulative effects
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IDomestic  consumers are clearly made  better-off under this extended policy reform:  real
consumption has unambiguously increased  on the whole time horizon.  More formally, to be
indifferent between this and the previous equilibrium allocations,  Turkish households would
have to be compensated in the latter case by an amount equivalent to almost one percent of
their consumption  flows over the  whole time horizon (4=+0.897  %).  Observe  from  the
cumulated equivalent variation, that the welfare effect for TR of full trade integration  with the
EU is positive, though admittedly quite modest.
The policy conclusion that emerges from these numbers seems therefore quite clear: a
partial trade reform in the form of a tariff harmonization with Europe is undesirable if it is not
complemented  by  a systematic  elimination  of all  forms of nontariff barriers  that  shield
domestic oligopolists from foreign competition at the expense  of local consumers.
Another  conclusion  that emerges from  the  previous  exercise  is that intertemporal
linkages are  important, and can not be assumed  away in policy analysis. To highlight this,
we perform  the same set of experiments  using the model adequately constrained to account
only for static reallocations.  The results are reported in Table 4.  Comparing the aggregate
consumption figures in this table to the corresponding  steady-state numbers in the previous
one clearly proves the powerful role played by intertemporal  mechanisms.  In particular, full
trade integration with the EU would be judged strongly detrimental to the Turkish household
(-2.23%) if growth effects had been neglected.
5.  Conclusion
For both political and economical reasons, TR has met strong resistance to its long held
aspiration of becoming a full member of the European bloc.  Despite this, and presumably as
a demonstration of commitment to this aspiration, the Turkish authorities have completed the
adjustment process  as  outlined  in the  1963 Ankara  Agreement,  and  in  1996  unilaterally
undertook a trade reform by harmonizing  the country's tariff structure to that of the EU.  The
resulting Customs Union is regarded  as a temporary first step toward full commodity-trade
integration within the unified European market
There are signs, however,  that political opposition to the government's pro competitive
stance may be strong enough  to bloc any further move  toward fuller trade liberalization.  We
have  shown  in this paper that such  a status quo should  not be considered  "an acceptable
compromise".  According  to our evaluations using  applied intertemporal GE analysis,  the
Turkish households  would  be impoverished by a partial trade reform.  In other words,  to be
79welfare improving, the trade reform would have to be pursued  further and nontariff barriers
on European trade removed.  Failure to do so could be more detrimental  to domestic welfare
than no reform at all.
80References
Celasun, M.,  1986,  "A General  Equilibrium  Model of the Turkish  Economy,  SIMLOG-1"
METU Studies in Development 13 (1-2), 29-64.
Dervis,  K.,  J.  deMelo  and  S.  Robinson,  1982,  General Equilibrium Models  for
Development Policy Analysis. London: Cambridge University Press.
Dixit,  A.K.  and  J.E.  Stiglitz,  1977,  "Monopolistic  Competition  and  Optimum  Product
Diversity," American Economic Review 67, 297-308.
Ethier, W.J.,  1982,  "National  and International Returns  to  Scale  in the Modem Theory  of
International Trade," American Economic Review 72, 389-405.
Gabszewicz,  J.J.  and J.P.  Vial,  1972,  "Oligopoly  'a la Cournot'  in a General  Equilibrium
Analysis," Journal  of Economic Theory 4, 381-400.
Grais, W., J. de Melo and S. Urata,  1984, "A General Equilibrium  Estimation of the Effects
of Reductions  in Tariffs  and  Quantitative  Restrictions  in Turkey  in  1978",  Report
DRD98, Development Research Department,  The World Bank.
Harris,  R.,  1984,  "Applied General  Equilibrium Analysis  of Small  Open Economies with
Scale  Economies  and Imperfect Competition",  American Economic Review 74  (5),
1016-1032.
Harrison, G.,  T.  Rutherford and D. Tarr,  1993,  "Trade Reform  in the Partially Liberalized
Economy of Turkey,"  World Bank Economic Review 7  (2),  191-217.
Kose,  A. and E. Yeldan,  1996,  "Turkiye Ekonomisinde Sektorel Isgucu Istihdami ve Ucret
Yapisi Uzerine Bir Deneme," Iktisat, Isletme ve Finans  11  (118),  18-25.
Lewis,  J. and S. Urata,  1983,  "Turkey:  Recent Economic Performance  and Medium Term
Prospects,  1978-1990,"  World Bank Staff Working  Paper 602, The World Bank.
Mercenier,  J.,  1995a,  "Can '1992'  Reduce  Unemployment  in  Europe?  On  Welfare  and
Employment  Effects  of  Europe's  Move  to  a  Single  Market,"  Journal of Policy
Modeling 17  (1),  1-37.
Mercenier, J.,  1995b, "Nonuniqueness of Solutions in Applied General Equilibrium Models
with Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition," Economic Theory 6,  161-177.
Mercenier, J. and P. Michel, 1994,  "Discrete Time Finite Horizon  Approximation of Optimal
Growth with Steady State Invariance," Econometrica 62, 635-656.
Mercenier, J. and M.C. Sampaio de Souza,  1994, "Structural Adjustment  and Growth in a
Highly  Indebted  Economy:  Brazil",  in  J.  Mercenier  and  T.N.  Srinivasan,  eds.,
Applied General Equilibrium Analysis  and Economic Development  :  Present
Achievements and Future Trends, Ann Harbor: University  of Michigan  Press,  281-
310.
81Mercenier,  J. and E. Yeldan,  1996,  "How Prescribed Policy  Can Mislead  When Data Are
Defective:  A  Follow Up  To Srinivasan  (1994)  Using  General  Equilibrium.,"  Staff
Report 207, Research Department,  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Negishi,  T.,  1961,  "Monopolistic  Competition  and  General  Equilibrium,"  Review  of
Economic Studies 28;  196-201.
Nikaido,  H.,  1975, Monopolistic Competition and Effective  Demand.  Princeton,  N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
Smith,  A.  and  A.J.  Venables,  1988,  "Completing  the  Internal  Market  in  the  European
Community:  Some  Industry  Simulations,"  European Economic Review  32,  1501-
1525.
Stokey,  N.,  1994,  "NAFTA and Mexican  Development,"  mimeo,  University  of Chicago
(August).
Yeldan, E., 1989, "Structural Adjustment and Trade in Turkey: Investigating  the Alternatives
that are Beyond Export-Led Growth," Journal  of Policy Modeling 11(2), 273-296.
82Appendix  A:  The  Model
Turkey (TR)  is part of a world economy consisting of itself and six other regions:  Great
Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany,  France, Italy, the rest of the  EU, and the rest of the
world.
1 The dynamic structure
In each country, there is a single  representative household, that is competitive,  infinitely
lived,  and utility-maximizing.  The domestic  household  owns all  the country's primary factors,
namely, labor and physical capital, which it rents to domestic firms only, at competitive prices w
and  r,  respectively.  (For  notational  convenience,  we  drop  the  country  subscript  in  this
subsection.)  We abstract from leisure/labor decisions and population growth so that labor is in
fixed supply L. The decision variables of the household are consumption C and investment L In
making these optimal decisions, the household has access to international financial  markets on
which it can borrow or lend.  Its intertemporal  decision problem is to maximize
(A.1)  e-Pt C(t) -7  dt,
1-y
subject to
(A.2)  K(t)  = I(t) - 6 K(t),
(A.3)  e-p t [pc(t) C(t) + p,(t)I(t)] dt  5
e-pt w(t)L(t) + r(t)K(t) +  rs(t) +G(t)]dt  +F(0),
K(0), F(0) given.
Equation (A.2) accounts for capital accumulation  with exponential depreciation.  Equation (A.3) is
the household's intertemporal budget constraint.  It specifies that the sum of discounted stream of
consumption  and  investment  expenditures  (for  convenience,  all  prices  are  defined  as
undiscounted)  cannot  exceed  the  discounted  sum  of  revenues  earned  from  primary factor
ownership and government  transfers G(t) plus initial holding of foreign assets  F(0).  The term
Is  'rs(t) in the budget constraint accounts  for the possibility  that, in the  short run, because  of
83unexpected shocks to imperfectly competitive industries, supranormal profits may add to capital
rental earnings.  All countries have the same constant discount rates p.
2  The instantaneous equilibrium  structure
We now neglect the time index.  We identify sectors  of activity by indices s and t, with S
representing  the set of all industries, so that s,t = 1,...,S.  The set S is partitioned  into the subset
of competitive, constant returns to scale sectors, denoted  C, and  the  subset of noncompetitive,
increasing returns to scale industries, denoted C.1  Countries are identified by indices i and j, with
i,j =  1,...,W  and  W= EUUTRuROW, where EU represents  the  European  Union,  and ROW
represents the rest of the world.  We keep track of the trade flows by following the usual practice
that identifies the first two indices with, respectively,  the country and the industry supplying the
good and, when appropriate, the next two with the client country  and industry.2
The household
For exposition ease, we break household i's static decision making into  a consumer and an
investor choice  problem.  This breakage  is  innocuous,  given  our separability  assumptions  on
preferences and investment technologies.  The domestic consumer values products of competitive
industries from different countries as imperfect substitutes (the Armington  assumption), while the
consumer  treats  as  specific  each  good  produced  by  individual  firms  operating  in  the
noncompetitive  industries  (the  Dixit-Stiglitz  1977  specification).  We  use  a two-level  utility
function.  The first level combines  consumption  goods c.si and assumes constant expenditure
shares psi. The second level determines the optimal composition of the consumption aggregates
in terms  of geographical  origin  for competitive  industries or in terms  of the individual  firm's
product for the noncompetitive sectors.  Formally, the consumer's preferences are
log Ci  =  Psi  log c.si  Psi = 1,
seS  seS
(A.4)  c.si  =  ~1ji  Csi  ,  SE  C, I
c.si  =  cn  Oi o  ,  seC
1  Though C also denotes aggregate  consumption,  no confusion can arise.
2  Thus,  a subscript  isjt indicates  a flow  originating  in  country  i, sector s  with  country j,  sector t as  the
destination.
84where 3si  denotes the  share parameters,  os denotes the Armington substitution  elasticities,  o
denotes the Dixit-Stiglitz differentiation  elasticities, and  njs denotes  the  number  of symmetric
oligopolists  operating in country j, sector s.3  Observe  that when se C,  Cjsi denotes the sales to the
consumer of the whole  industry s of country j,  whereas when  sE C, it represents  the sales of a
single representative  firm.  The interpretation of the two elasticities  as and  of is therefore  very
different:  the latter will typically be larger than the former. For goods that are nontraded we have
si=O0 V/jai.
The consumer maximizes (A.4) with respect to cjsi, subject to
(A.5)  PciCi  2  1 (1+si)  Pjsi c  +  (l+jsi)Pjsi  njs Cjsi,
jEW  SEC  SEC
where zjsi is tariff rates, Pjsi is prices on which consumers have no influence,  and the term on the
left side results from the intertemporal  decision of the household.
The investor's problem is to determine the optimal composition of the domestic investment
good; for this, the investor maximizes (A.6) with respect to Ijsi:
log li  =  osi log I.si,  o)si=  1,
seS  seS
(A.6)  I.si  =  J  jsisi si  T1,  sE  C,
je W
I.si  =  f  si  isi  ,  SE  C,
jeW
subject to
(A.7) plii >  2  (+si)  Pjsi  Ijsi +  (l+si)  Pjsi njs Ijsi ,
where, again,  jsi is tariff rates, pjsi is prices which investors take as given, and the term on the
left  side  results  from  the  intertemporal  decision  of the  household.  Observe  that  the  share
parameters  Sci and  Sjsi in (A.4) and (A.6)  are specific to each  decision problem, so that price
3  The symmetry assumption implies that imperfectly competitive domestic firms within  a sector have the same
cost structure and market shares.
85responsiveness of the two final demand components  will differ,  even though the consumer and
the investor are assumed to have the same substitution and differentiation  elasticities (a, and  c)
since no econometric information is available on potential differences.
The Firms
a) Competitive industries.  In  competitive  industries,  the  representative  firm  of country  i,
sector s operates with constant returns to scale technologies, combining variable capital KY  and
labor L Y  as well as intermediate inputs xjtis.  Material inputs are introduced into the production
function  in  a way  similar  to  the  way  consumption  goods  are  treated  in the  preferences  of
households:  with  an Armington  specification  for goods  produced  by competitive  industries  and
with  an  Ethier  1982  specification,  i.e.,  with  product  differentiation  at  the firm  level,  in the
imperfectly  competitive sectors.  Input demands  by country i's representative  producer of sector
sE C result from the minimization of the variable unit cost vi  :
(A.8)  vis Qis  =X(X  (l+'Iti)  Pjtixjtis +  (l+'jti)  Pjt  nfl  + w  Ls  +  r Ks
jEW  tec  tE C
for a given level of output Qjs, such that




(A.9)  x  =  tis  f3Jtis  xju.  6  tE C,
=  ti  2_  njt  IPi  j t  xjtis  O-1  ,  tEC,
where the as and the  /3s  are share parameters  with
cxLs +caKs +X  art  =  1,
86Cost minimization  implies marginal cost pricing (Pisj=Vis) and zero  profits  (iris =  0) in the
competitive sectors.
b)  Noncompetitive industries.  Noncompetitive  industries  have  increasing  returns  to scale  in
production.  We  model  this by  assuming  that in  addition  to  variable  costs  associated  with
technological  constraints  similar to (A.8) and (A.9),  the individual firms  in country i, sector s
face  fixed primary  factor  costs.  This  introduces  a  wedge  between  total unit  costs  Vis and
marginal costs vis:
(A.10)  Vis  =  vi  +  [WL  s  C,
is
where  Qi,  LiF and  K  denote, respectively,  the individual  firm's output, fixed labor,  and fixed
capital.
Because  of the presence  of various  forms of nontariff barriers,  national economies  are
assumed  initially  segmented.  The  noncompetitive  firm  facing  demand  segmentation  takes
advantage  of the monopoly power it has on each individual country market.  For this purpose, the
firm is endowed with the knowledge of preferences  (A.4) and technologies  (A.6) through (A.9)
of its clients.  It then performs a partial equilibrium profit maximization calculation assuming that
in each  country,  each individual  client's  current-price  expenditure  on the  whole  industry  is
unaffected by its own strategic action zisj, so that
(PsjPcjCj) =  0,  W,
aZis
(A.11)  a Osjpjlj) = 0,  je W,
a(asjtvjtQjt) = O,  j  W,  to  S.
We make the Cournot assumption of noncooperative  behavior with sales to each individual market
as the strategic variable  Zis.  Profit maximization  then yields that
(A.12)  Pisj  Vis  alog pisj  sEje,
with
(A.13)  Qis  =  Z Zisj.
je W
87The computation  of the elasticities on the right side of (A.12) requires  inverting log-linearized
aggregate demand systems.  This is a very complex calculation, the details of which are given in
Mercenier  1995b.
The definition of oligopolistic industry profits then immediately follows:
(A.14)  Ipis  =  fis(  PisIZisI - Vis Qis)  sE C.
The static equilibrium conditions
The instantaneous  GE is defined  as  a static  allocation  supported  by  a vector  of prices
(Pisj,  W,  ri), sE S, and ije W consistent with the intertemporal  constraints  and choices in (A.1)
through (A.3) and such that
- Tariff revenues are rebated  to consumers lump-sum:
(A.15)  G  =  X  V.  j'siPjsi (cI'i+1 5 i+X xJ'sit) +X  j5s  Pi'si nJs  +  xisit))
jEW  kseC  tES  sE C
- Consumers maximize (A.4) subject to (A.5);
- Investors maximize (A.6) subject to (A.7);
- Firms minimize  (A.8) subject to (A.9);
- Oligopolistic firms set prices according  to (A.12) and satisfy the resulting demand so
that
(A. 16)  Zjsj'  =  CisJ 1 + Iisj'  +  Xisj't,  SE  C,  i~je W,
te S
and  (  A.13) hlds;.
.88(A.19)  Li  =  L''  +  ~  nis[L4+L],  ijeW;
sEC  seC
- Industry concentration ns>  1 (sE C, and iE W), adjusts with inertia to the existence  of
nonnegative oligopoly rents so that, in the long run, these rents are null.  The process of entry and
exit of firms is implemented in the following way:
nis(O) given,  nl  "(oo)  such that zi  "(oo)  =  0,
(A.20)
ni5(t) = 8[n  i5 (oo) - ni5(O)], 0  <60  <1.
The first period ROW wage rate is chosen as the numeraire.
89Appendix  B:  Calibration and  Computational  Strategy
The calibration  procedure for the instantaneous  GE  is extensively  discussed in Mercenier
1995a. We avoid duplication  and focus our discussion on the treatment of dynamics.
We first note that the budget constraint (A.3)  can  be equivalently  written in the following
differential form:
F(t) =  pF(t) + w(t)L(t)  + r(t)K(t) +  n r(t) + G  c( t  +
(B.1)
F(O) given,  nm  e-P t F(t) =0,
t-oo
where again we neglect country subscripts  for notational  ease.  We next make  use of results by
Mercenier  and Michel  1994  on dynamic  aggregation  and  write  the  following  finite-horizon
discrete-time  approximation  to the individual household's intertemporal choice problem:
N-1  -yi-
(B.2)  Max  CN-i  o C(t )  /
3N 1  CCtN)
n=o  1-Y  P  1-Y
such that
F(tn+ 1)  - F(tn)  =
An  [pF(t)  +  w(t)L(tn)  +  r(tn)  K(tn)  + 1: irsln)  +Gt)-+Gt)~n  i~njt)
s
F(t0),  K(t0)  given,
where t,  4,  an~ and /3N are as introduced in section 2.3.  Assuming  the world economy initially
is  in  steady-state,  these  results  make  the  calibration  of  the  intertemporal  equilibrium
straightforward using the following first-order conditions:
F  n-)-  ,  n-)  0<  n <N,
,(tN)  =  i(tN)  - ~tv]
90Reduced as it is by dynamic aggregation, the dimensionality of this five-period model is still
a numerical challenge.  To overcome  this problem, we build on Negishi's  1961 existence proof of
an imperfectly  competitive  GE.  We  first exogenize  oligopolistic  markups  and  solve for the
intertemporal  equilibrium  allocations,  prices,  and  industry  structures.4  Using  these newly
computed prices and market shares,  we then upgrade the  optimal markups.  We iterate  Gauss-
Seidel way until convergence to a fixed point.
This numerical procedure  proved quite reliable, and  no computational  difficulty is  worth
reporting.  Nevertheless,  there  is little  control  on the search path with such a strategy,  and  no
serious exploration of the  possible existence of more than one equilibrium  is possible.  This is
particularly unpleasant in view of the recent results of Mercenier 1995b, which suggest that in this
generation  of applied  GE models,  multiple equilibria  can  exist.  It  should  be  emphasized,
however,  that even though the structure of the instantaneous GE equilibrium of this model bears
strong similarities to that of Mercenier  1995b, the treatment of factor markets differs substantially:
we do not assume here that factors and factor owners move internationally.  Though there is no
reason  to believe  that the change  eliminates the  risk of nonuniqueness,  numerical  tests  with
Mercenier's  1995b model suggest that the risk is actually reduced.
4  All computations have been performed using GAMS/MINOS  (Brooke et al.  1988).
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